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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STANTON TRANSPORTATION COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMPANY, 
a division of Y 0 U N G S T 0 W N 
SHEET & TUBE COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
vs. Plaintiff, 
MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS, 
JEAN DAVIS and JOAN PRESTON, 
partners, doing business under the 
firm name of DAVIS OIL COM-
PANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8951 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Parties and others will be referred to herein as follows : 
Stanton Transportation Company will be referred to as 
"Stanton" or "appellant;" Davis Oil Company and its part-
ners as "Davis" or "respondents" and Walker & Wilson 
Drilling Company as "Walker-Wilson" or "driller." The 
following abbreviations will be used: "R" for clerk's files; 
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"TRA" for transcript of hearing on September 20, 1957, 
and "TRB" for the transcript of hearing on November 5 
and 6, 1957. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The disagreement between the statement of facts of the 
respective parties is negligible and the additional facts 
stated by respondents are without legal significance. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
UTAH MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE GIVES 
LIEN TO PERSON WHO TRANSPORTS DRILL-
ING EQUIPMENT TO WELL SITE WHERE 
IT IS USED TO DRILL OIL WELL. 
(a) Language of Statute is Clear and Unambig-
uous 
(b) Utah Statute to be Construed Liberally 
(c) Legislative History and Wording of Statute 
POINT II. 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DAVIS AND THE 
DRILLER COVERED THE COST OF TRANS-
PORTATION. 
POINT III. 
TRANSPORTATION IS A LIENABLE ITEM 
UNDER MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE GIVES 
LIEN TO PERSON WHO TRANSPORTS DRILL-
ING EQUIPMENT TO WELL SITE WHERE 
IT IS USED TO DRILL OIL WELL. 
Both appellant and respondents recognize in their re-
spective briefs that the sole question before the Court on 
this appeal is whether Stanton is entitled to a lien for the 
value of work performed in transporting drilling equipment 
to a well site where it was used to drill the Davis well and 
that the answer to this question depends upon whether Stan-
ton did work for the development of the Davis oil well within 
the meaning of the Utah mechanics' lien statute. The gov-
erning statute is Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
which is set forth in detail on page 9 of appellant's brief. 
The applicable portion of this statute provides as follows: 
"* * * All persons who shall do work or 
furnish materials for the prospecting, development, 
preservation or working of any oil or gas well, 
* * * shall have a lien upon the property upon 
or concerning which they have rendered service, per-
formed labor or furnished materials, for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed or mater-
ials furnished by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person acting 
by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise 
* * *" 
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(a) Language of Statute is Clear and Unambig-
uous 
Respondents argue that the language of the statute is 
not broad enough to give liens to persons who perform work 
such as that performed by Stanton. A reading of the stat-
ute shows that the language used by the Legislature is ex-
tremely broad and the terms used are clear and unambig-
uous. We have found no other statute and respondents have 
cited none which contains language nearly so broad in de-
scribing persons who do work connected with oil wells who 
are entitled to liens. 
There can be no question that the work done by Stanton 
was done solely for the purpose of developing an oil well 
on the Davis property. The trial court found and respon-
dents have not questioned the finding, that Davis knew that 
in order to drill a well it would be necessary to obtain special-
ized cranes and trucks to move the drilling equipment to 
the well site and to assist in erecting it thereon (R. 78). 
The proposed well site was in an isolated area in southeast-
ern Utah. Without drilling equipment there would be no 
well. Without Stanton's trucks or trucks similar thereto, 
the drilling equipment would never have reached the well 
site. The only reason for Stanton to transport drilling 
equipment to such an isolated spot was so that the Davis 
well could be drilled. To hold that such work was not for 
the development of an oil well would require a warping of 
the language of the statute or a reading into it of restric-
tions that are not there. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
(b) Utah Statute to be Construed Liberally 
Respondents on page 6 of their brief recognize that this 
Court in construing the Utah statute is bound by the pro-
visions of Section 68-3-2, U. C. A., 1953, which provides 
that: 
"The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has 
no application to the statutes of this state. The stat-
utes establish the laws of this state respecting the 
subjects to which they relate, and their provisions 
and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice." 
The object of mechanics' lien statutes as discussed on pages 
21 through 25 of appellant's brief is to insure that those 
who enhance the value of property belonging to another by 
their work or labor shall be paid. 
Respondents cite Section 13, American Jurisprudence, 
Mechanics' Liens, as authority for the proposition that the 
weight of authority holds that mechanics' liens are to be 
strictly construed as to the class or classes of persons who 
may assert the lien. Section 13 also states that there is 
authority to the effect that the liberal rule of construction 
should be used. Regardless of what the law may be else-
where, the Utah courts are bound by Section 68-3-2, and it 
does not exclude the provisions of the Utah mechanics' lien 
statute from the rule that the provisions of Utah statutes in 
derogation of the common law shall be liberally construed. 
That the rule is to be applied even to provisions providing 
for the class of people who are within the scope of the 
statute is evidenced by the fact that the Utah Supreme 
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Court has applied it elsewhere in determining what per-
sons come within the scope of a Utah staute which was in 
derogation of the common law. In re Garr's Estate, 31 
Utah 57, 86 Pac. 757. 
Respondents also contend on page 6 of their brief that 
even though the rule of liberal construction applies in Utah, 
the "courts cannot create rights and should not do so by 
unnatural or forced construction." With this position we 
concur. By the same token, the courts cannot deprive a 
person of rights by giving a statute such a construction. 
We submit that to hold that Stanton did not do work for 
the development of the Davis well would result in a forced 
and unnatural construction of the statute. 
(c) Legislative History and Wording of Statute 
The wording of the Utah statute and its legislative 
history show that the Legislature intended to give a broader 
coverage to persons connected with the mining and oil in-
dustries than to persons in other categories and did intend 
to restrict liens to persons who are upon the subject prem-
ises at the time they perform the work. Respondents argue 
on pages 8 through 17 of their brief that there is no sig-
nificance in the fact that the Legislature used different 
wording in describing the persons in different categories 
who are entitled to liens. Such an argument is contrary 
to the well recognized rules of statutory construction that 
when the Legislature uses words in a statute it is presumed 
that it intended to use them and knew their meaning, that 
every word was intended to serve some useful purpose and 
each word is to be given some effect. Conversely, it is not 
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to be presumed that the Legislature intended any word to 
be meaningless, redundant, or useless. 86 C. J. S., Statutes, 
Section 316, p. 549. 
Ever since the Legislature first made provision for 
mechanics' liens in Utah, it has separated the persons en-
titled to liens into different categories depending upon 
the nature of their work. In describing the persons within 
each category who are entitled to liens, it has used differ-
ent language. Due to the nature of mining and related 
industries, persons doing work in connection therewith have 
been placed in a separate category since prior to 1898. See 
Section 1381, Rev. Stat. 1898. The language used in con-
nection with this category gives broader coverage than any 
of the others. 
Prior to 1933 the categories were described in differ-
ent statutory sections. See Sections 3722, 3731 and 3747 
of Compiled Laws of 1917. When the Utah laws were re-
vised in 1933, these sections were consolidated into Section 
52-1-3, Revised Statutes of 1933, which is now Section 
38-1-3, U. C. A., 1953. The distinction between the various 
categories of persons was maintained after the revision and 
the basic differences in the wording used to describe the 
persons within each category who were entitled to liens 
remained the same. At the time of the revision, the words 
"oil and gas well" were added to the category related to the 
mining industry. Thus the Legislature expressly recognized 
that all persons who do work for the prospecting, develop-
ment, preservation or working of any oil and gas shall be 
entitled to a lien. 
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The fact that the Legislature felt that it was necessary 
to separate persons into different categories and continued 
the distinction after the 1933 revision coupled with the 
different language used in describing those entitled to liens 
within each category is a strong indication that the Legis-
lature intended that they should be treated differently. For 
this reason, the particular wording used is very important 
in determining the legislative intent. 
The present statute divides those entitled to liens into 
the following classes : 
(a) Contractors, subcontractors and all persons per-
forming labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in, 
the construction or alteration of, or addition to, or repair 
of, any building, structure or improvement upon land; 
(b) All foundry men and boiler makers; 
(c) All persons performing labor or furnishing ma-
terials for the construction, repairing or carrying on of any 
mill, manufactory or hoisting works; 
(d) All persons who shall do work or furnish mater-
ials for the prospecting, development, preservation or work-
ing of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or 
deposit; and 
(e) Licensed architects and engineers and artisam 
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifica-
tions, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superinten-
dency, or who have rendered other like professional service, 
or bestowed labor. 
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Since classes (b) and (e) are limited to persons who 
do particular types of work, our remarks regarding dif-
ferences in wording are directed to the other three classes. 
The first distinction in wording is that class (d) which is 
the class that relates to oil wells is the only class which 
gives liens to persons who do work for. Class (a) is limited 
to persons who perform labor upon and (c) to persons who 
perform labor for. As pointed out in appellant's brief at 
pages 12 and 13, the courts have long recognized that the 
word "work" is much more comprehensive than the term 
"labor." This point is not disputed by respondents. The 
courts have long recognized that transportation is covered 
by such terms. In re Hope Mining Company, 1 Sawy. 710, 
Fed. Cas. No. 6,681, 9 Morrison Mining Reports 364, Gould 
v. Wise, 18 Nev. 253, 3 Pac. 30; Davis v. Mial, 86 N. J. Law 
167, 90 Atl. 315; West Jersey & S. S. R. Co. v. County of 
Cape May, 100 N. J. Eq. 181, 135 Atl. 74; Standard Ace. 
Ins. Co. v. United States, 58 S. Ct. 314, 302 U. S. 442. 
The second distinction is that class (a) provides only 
for persons who perform labor upon while class (d) pro-
vides for persons who do work for. Respondents argue 
under their Point I (b) that there is no significance in the 
fact that the Legislature used different words. This ignores 
the fact that as a matter of common usage these words 
have very different meanings. Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary defines "upon" as meaning "on ; in all senses;" 
"on" is defined as "indicating position of contact with or 
against a supporting surface" while "for" is defined as 
"indicating that in consideration of which, in view of which, 
or with reference to which, anything is, is done, or takes 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
place." As used in the mechanics' lien statute, upon has 
a much more restricted meaning than for. That the Legis-
lature recognized this difference is evidenced by the man-
ner in which they used the two words in Section 3731 of 
the Compiled Laws of 1917. This section provided in part 
as follows: 
"3731. (1381.) Liens on mines. The provisions 
of this chapter shall apply to aU persons who shall 
do work or furnish materials for the working, pres-
ervation, or development of any mine, lode, mining 
claim, or deposit yielding metals or minerals of any 
kind, or for the working, preservation, or develop-
ment of any such mine, lode, or deposit in search of 
such metals or minerals, and to all persons who shall 
do work or furnish materials upon any shaft, tunnel, 
incline, adit, drain, or other excavation of any such 
mine, lode, or deposit; * * *" 
It would appear clear from the underlined portions of 
the above cited statute that the Legislature recognized the 
difference in the meaning of the words and that the classi-
fication where it used "for" is broader than the one where 
it used "upon." Although the latter class of persons might 
be restricted to recovering for work performed when they 
were actually upon the subject premises, under no stretch 
of the imagination could it be said that Legislature intended 
to place such a restriction upon those in the first class. 
The words "oil or gas well" were added to the provi-
sion providing for persons connected with the mining in-
dustry and the words "or concerning" were added to the 
provision describing property which could be attached at 
the time of the 1933 revision. After the revision, the latter 
provision provided that persons entitled to liens "shall 
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have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished 
materials * * *" Respondents argue on page 11 of 
their brief that since "there is nothing in the revised stat-
ute to limit the applicability of the word 'concerning' to per-
sons doing work for the development of an oil and gas well" 
that the word "concerning" had no significance so far as 
such persons are concerned. Then on page 15 they state that 
the word "concerning" applies only to the services per-
formed by architects and engineers even though there is 
nothing in the statute to so limit its applicability to that 
class. Prior to the 1933 revision Section 3722 of the Com-
piled Laws of 1917 gave engineers and architects liens "upon 
the property upon which they rendered services, etc." N oth-
ing was said about the property "concerning" which they 
rendered service. The language of Section 3722 as related 
to architects and engineers was included almost verbatim in 
the revised statute. There is absolutely nothing to connect 
the word "concerning" to architects and engineers. The 
fact that the provision describing property which could be 
attached was extended at the same time that the provision 
describing persons entitled to liens was enlarged to cover 
persons who do work for the development of any oil or gas 
well would indicate that the Legislature intended that the 
former should apply to the latter in the absence of any 
other reason being shown for adding the word "concerning." 
Any other construction would render the word meaningless. 
Respondents argue on page 12 of their brief that if 
appellant's argument regarding the significance of the 
word "concerning" is correct then the work performed by 
all persons named in the statute need only "concern" the 
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12 
property, and not be performed upon or for such property. 
That such an argument is erroneous is indicated by the 
definition of the persons entitled to liens in class (a). There 
the Legislature has limited by definition the persons entitled 
to liens to those "performing labor upon." These persons 
are provided for in the provision setting forth the property 
which can be attached in the same manner in which they 
were treated prior to the 1933 revision, to wit: "shall have 
a lien upon the property upon which they have rendered 
service or performed labor." If the Court finds that the 
Legislature intended by the use of the word "concerning" 
to describe the property which those persons in class (d) 
could attach, it does not follow that it must also apply to 
the property which the persons in class (a) can attach. 
We submit that the legislative history and wording of 
the statute show that the Legislature intended to give a 
broader coverage to the persons in class (d) than those in 
the other classes and that it did not intend to restrict them 
to having liens only for the value of work which was per-
formed upon the subject property. 
POINT II. 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DAVIS AND THE 
DRILLER COVERED THE COST OF TRANS-
PORTATION. 
The circumstances surrounding the making of the con-
tract between Davis and the driller and the contract itself 
show clearly that the parties considered the cost of trans-
porting the drilling equipment to the well site at the time 
they entered into the contract. They expressly provided in 
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the contract for the manner in which this cost would be 
paid and who was to have the responsibility for obtaining 
the necessary equipment for the transportation. 
The well site was located in an isolated area in south-
eastern Utah. It was necessary to travel over 42 miles of 
unimproved roads and ford the San Juan River in order 
to reach it (R. 79). Both parties knew that in order to move 
the drilling equipment to the well site it would be necessary 
to obtain specialized cranes and trucks (R. 78). It is un-
reasonable to believe that they did not consider the cost of 
transporting the drilling equipment when they arrived at 
the price which Davis was to pay the driller. 
Schedule "A" of the contract (see plaintiff's exhibit 
No. 37) describes the equipment and services needed to 
drill the well and indicates who is to be responsible for 
furnishing them. Paragraph E covers special services and 
equipment and under item 9 is shown cranes and trucks for 
moving in and rigging up. The driller was designated as 
the person responsible for obtaining the cranes and trucks. 
Respondents argue on page 18 of their brief that this means 
merely the equipment necessary to move the equipment onto 
the well site. There is nothing in the contract which im-
poses such a restriction and in view of the location of the 
well it would seem to be much more reasonable to assume 
that it referred to the trucks and cranes which both parties 
knew would have to be obtained in order to transport the 
equipment. 
Respondents argue that the distance that the driller 
had to transport the rig had no bearing whatsoever upon 
what Davis agreed to pay for drilling the well. (See page 
~· \ ---
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17 of their brief.) Again respondents ignore the practical 
factors surrounding the making of the contract. Although 
Davis may not have known where the drilling rig was lo-
cated, there can be no question that the driller knew ex-
actly where it was and how much it would cost to transport 
the rig to the Davis well site. To argue that this was not 
a factor which the driller considered in determining the 
contract price is to totally ignore realities. 
Schedule "B" of the contract sets forth the manner 
in which the driller was to be paid for the work which was 
performed (plaintiff's exhibit No. 37). The driller and 
Davis agreed in paragraph 4 (d) of the contract that driller 
would receive the sum of $8.25 for each lineal foot of hole 
drilled. Items 1 and 4 7 of Schedule "B" provide that the 
only reimbursement that driller was to receive for costs of 
moving his equipment in and out was the footage rates. 
It is therefore impossible to believe that both parties did 
not consider the cost of transporting the drilling equipment 
to the well site in arriving at what the footage rate should 
be. The fact that they expressly provided that the cost of 
moving in was to be paid on a footage basis indicates that 
they considered the cost of transportation in determining 
what the footage rate should be. Any other assumption 
would not be reasonable. 
POINT III. 
TRANSPORTATION IS A LIENABLE ITEM 
UNDER MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTES. 
The question before this Court is whether the work 
done by Stanton was work for the development of an oil 
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~ell within the meaning of the Utah statute. We have 
:ound no other statute that gives such broad coverage to 
Jersons who do work connected with oil wells and respon-
lents have cited none in their brief. The language of the 
rarious mechanics' liens statutes varies considerably. It 
.s therefore not surprising that the courts have arrived at 
iifferent results in determining whether transportation is 
~ lienable under their particular statute. It is significant, 
'lowever, that many courts have allowed a lien for the cost 
Jf transporting machinery and other items under statutes 
that are much more restrictive than the Utah statute. 
There are only two jurisdictions, Texas and Oklahoma, 
that have directly considered the question of whether 
:!barges for the transportation of drilling equipment to a 
well site are lienable. The Texas courts held that it was 
not while the Oklahoma courts held that it was. Respon-
dents on page 19 of their brief cite the Texas case of Gray 
v. Magdalena Oil Company, 240 S. W. 693, as authority for 
the proposition that charges for transportation are not 
lienable. The Texas court in holding that transportation of 
drilling equipment was not lienable considered Section 5621, 
Revised Civil Statutes of Texas which provides liens, in the 
words of the court, for "the person who labors or furnishes 
material, etc., to erect any house or improvement, etc., shall 
have a lien on such house * * *" On motion for re-
hearing the court cursorily stated that no lien existed under 
Section 5621. Section 5621 provided in part that "any per-
:on * * * who shall * * * perform labor or furn-
.sh material * * * used in digging, drilling, torpedo-
.ng, separating, completing, maintaining or repairing any 
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such oil or gas well * * * shall have a lien * * *" 
(Emphasis added.) That this language is much more re-
strictive than that used in the Utah statute is clear. The 
Texas statute restricts its application to persons who per-
form labor in certain specified operations connected with 
the drilling of oil wells, all of which occur after the equip. 
ment is on the well site and drilling is commenced. The 
Utah statute which provides for those persons who do work 
for the development of oil wells is not nearly so restrictive. 
The Texas court gave no reason for its holding other than to 
state that no lien existed under either statute. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Cleveland v. High-
tower, 108 Okla. 84, 234 Pac. 614, construed Section 7466, 
C. 0. S. 1921. This statute had almost exactly the same 
wording as the statute considered by the Texas court in the 
Gray case but the courts construed different provisions. 
The Oklahoma court held that one who transports casing 
to a well site is entitled to a lien against the leasehold. The 
court reached this result even though the statute limited the 
persons entitled to liens to those who "perform labor." The 
Utah statute which gives liens to persons who "do work for" 
is much broader. The other Oklahoma cases cited on page 
16 of appellant's brief have adopted the same reasoning. 
We submit that the holding and reasoning of the Oklahoma 
courts as indicated on pages 15 and 16 is much more in 
accord with the objects of the Utah statute than is the result 
of the Texas case. 
The gist of respondents' argument on pages 22 and 23 
of their brief seems to be that Stanton should not be entitled 
to a mechanics' lien because it is a common carrier. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
simple answer to this argument is that the Utah statute 
provides for any person who shall do work for the develop-
ment of an oil well and does not provide for any person 
except common carriers. Respondents argue on page 22 that 
the court in Cashman v. Russell, 33 Ariz. 451, 265 Pac. 606, 
excluded common carriers by distinguishing Santa Fe P. & 
P. Ry. Co. v. Arizona Smelting Co., 13 Ariz. 95, 108 Pac. 
256, and by citing Union Traction Co. v. Kansas Casualty & 
Surety Co., 112 Kan. 774, 213 Pac. 169. The Cashman case 
was cited by appellant to show the reasoning of the courts 
in holding that the cost of transporting machinery is lien-
able. Admittedly, it did pass on the question of whether 
a common carrier would be entitled to a lien but neither 
did it hold that common carriers should not be entitled to 
liens. The Santa Fe case referred to held that a common 
carrier is not entitled to a lien for freight charges for trans-
portation under a statute which provided that: 
"All foundrymen, boiler makers, and all per-
sons who labor or furnish machinery, boilers, cast-
ings, or other material for the construction, altera-
tion, repairs, or carrying on of any mill, manufactory, 
or hoisting works at the request of the owner there-
of, or his agent, shall have a lien on the same for the 
amount due him or them therefor." 
This is certainly not authority for the general proposition 
that common carriers should not be entitled to liens. In 
fact the court in the Santa Fe case specifically stated that it 
did not think "that the fact that a railroad company may 
have lien (common carriers) for freight would operate to 
prevent its claiming a lien (mechanics) under this statute 
if the language of the statute permits. We have to deter-
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mine, if we can, from the language of the statute and the 
conditions existing at time of its passage, the intent of the 
Legislature." (Material in parenthesis added.) Likewise, 
the other cases cited by respondents as authority for this 
proposition all turn on the construction of statutes contain-
ing language much more restrictive than that used in the 
Utah statute. None of them indicate that where the lan-
guage of the statute is broad enough to include common 
carriers as in the case of the Utah statute they should be 
excluded. In addition, many cases have expressly held that 
common carriers are entitled to liens under mechanic lien 
and similar statutes. See West Jersey & S. S. R. Co. v. 
County of Cape May, 100 N. J. Eq. 181, 135 Atl. 74; State 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 34 Del. 158, 145 Atl. 172; 
Sommers Const. Co. v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 62 Ga. 23, 
7 S. E. 2d 429; Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. U. S., 58 S. Ct. 314, 
302 u. s. 442. 
Appellant cited a number of cases on pages 18 through 
19 of its brief where the courts have held that transporta-
tion is lienable. We admit that many of these cases can be 
distinguished from the case now before the court but feel 
that it is significant that courts on numerous occasions have 
recognized transportation as a lienable item on one theory 
or another under statutes with much more restrictive lan-
guage than that used in the Utah statute. It is recognized 
that due to the different wording in the various lien stat-
utes the decisions as to whether transportation is lienable 
are not all in accord. However, even a cursory reading of 
the cases cited by respondents as authority for the proposi-
tion that transportation is not lienable shows that in every 
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case the language of the statute construed was much more 
restrictive than that in the Utah statute. While no cases 
have been cited where it has been held that transportation 
is not lienable under statutes as broad as the Utah statute, 
numerous cases have held that it is lienable under much 
more restricted statutes. 
The Utah Legislature has since 1890 recognized the 
principle that the property owner who is enriched as a 
result of the labor or work of another should be the one 
primarily responsible for seeing that those who makes his 
enrichment possible are paid. Recognizing that the owner 
is in the best position to determine whether those he con-
tracts with are financially responsible, it has required him 
to obtain a bond from the contractor in order to protect 
such persons or run the risk of being held personally re-
sponsible. Section 14-2-1, U. C. A., 1953. Davis failed to 
obtain such a bond in the instant case. To hold that Stanton 
is not entitled to a lien under the circumstances of this case 
would require a complete disregard of the clear and unam-
biguous language of the statute and would be contrary to 
the objects and purposes sought by the Legislature. 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit that the trial court was in error in holding 
that Stanton was not entitled to a lien for the work it per-
formed under the Utah statute and that there is nothing 
in respondents' brief which alters this conclusion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STERLING D. COLTON, 
For Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, 
ALVIN J. MEIKLEJOHN, JR., 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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